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hume’s Theory of moral imaginaTion
Mark Collier
David Hume endorses three statements that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce com-
passion toward their plight, (2) adopting the moral point of view often 
requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strang-
ers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. 
Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two 
types of sympathy. We feel compassion toward those we perceive to be in 
distress because associative sympathy leads us to mirror their emotions, 
but our ability to enter into the afflictions of distant strangers involves 
cognitive sympathy and merely requires us to reflect on how we would 
feel in their shoes. This hybrid theory of sympathy receives a good deal of 
support from recent work on affective mirroring and cognitive pretense. 
Hume’s account should appeal to contemporary researchers, therefore, 
who are interested in the nature of moral imagination.
1. symPatHy and comPassion
In A Treatise of Human Nature 2.2.7, “of Compassion,” Hume attempts 
to understand why we care about the pain and suffering of others. When 
we encounter agents in distress, he observes, we feel concern for their 
plight. But why do their sorrows and afflictions matter to us? Hume 
maintains that our compassionate responses to those in distress are 
“easy to explain” in terms of the principles of sympathy (T 2.2.7.2, SBN 
369).1 Human beings have a natural tendency, on his account, to mir-
ror the emotional states of others. We care about their welfare, in other 
words, because we vicariously feel their pain.
 Hume’s surgery example provides a helpful illustration of this pro-
pensity to resonate with the affections of those around us:
Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, ‘tis 
certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, 
the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all 
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the signs of anxiety and concern in the patient and assistants, wou’d 
have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments 
of pity and terror. (T 3.3.1.7, SBN 576)
Spectators present at an operation, especially in 1739, would become 
alarmed. This secondhand response, however, is rather odd. It is obvious 
why the patient would become terrified as the doctor heats the irons 
and sharpens his instruments. But why would spectators feel this way? 
They are not the ones, after all, about to undergo surgery.
 This difficulty can be resolved, according to Hume, in terms of emotion-
al communication. Spectators in the operating room become terrified, on 
his account, because the fear and anxiety of the patient are transmitted 
to them: “As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates 
itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to 
another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature” 
(ibid.). Hume refers to this transfer of affect, at one point, as a species 
of “contagion” (T 3.3.3.5, SBN 605). But talk of emotional contagion, of 
course, is entirely metaphorical. Viruses can spread through physical 
contact. But how does one literally catch someone else’s emotions?
 Hume maintains that the mystery surrounding emotional contagion 
can be dispelled at the level of associations. The process begins when 
spectators make attributions concerning their feelings to others. We 
cannot directly observe the contents of other minds, of course, but we 
can nevertheless infer them on the basis of sensory cues (T 3.3.1.7, SBN 
576). We recognize that those who wince and moan are in a state of pain, 
for example, because this feeling is associated with such gestures and 
exclamations. our idea of their pain, moreover, is subsequently trans-
formed into an impression2:
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by 
its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conver-
sation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into 
an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to 
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any 
original affection. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317; cf. T 3.3.1.7, SBN 576)
Hume’s official position is that ideas and impressions differ solely in 
terms of their force and vivacity (T 2.1.11.7, SBN 318–19; cf. T 1.1.1.3, 
SBN 2). When ideas are sufficiently enlivened, therefore, this distinc-
tion would collapse.3
 The feelings of others, it seems, rub off on us. We admire the lifestyles 
of the rich and famous, for example, because we “enter into” and “par-
take of their pleasure” (T 2.2.5.14, SBN 362). But our tendency toward 
affective mirroring is on clearest display, according to Hume, when it 
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comes to negatively valenced emotions. The afflictions and sorrows of 
others, as he puts it, “have always a stronger and more lasting influence 
than any pleasure or enjoyment” (T 2.2.7.2, SBN 369). We feel compas-
sion toward those we perceive to be in distress, therefore, because our 
ideas of their suffering are especially lively and thus easily converted 
into impressions.4
 Hume remarks that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another” 
insofar as they “reflect each other’s emotions” (T 2.2.6.21, SBN 365). This 
observation was, of course, remarkably prescient. Social neuroscientists 
have recently discovered the existence of affective mirror systems in 
the brain that enable us to feel the pain of others.5 These researchers 
have developed a novel paradigm with which to study our responses 
to the emotional states of others. In these experiments, brain-imaging 
techniques are used to compare neural activity in two conditions: (1) 
when one feels pain and (2) when one observes another in pain. Singer 
et al. (2004) measured activation in the “pain matrix” of the brain, for 
example, as stimulation was applied to the hands of subjects via elec-
trodes; they subsequently found similar firing patterns when subjects 
were presented with signs that those dear to them were in pain.
 The Singer experiments involved emotional communication between 
loved ones. But further studies have shown that this propensity to reflect 
the emotions of others extends to strangers as well.6 These studies lend 
support, moreover, for Hume’s associative hypothesis. Why is it that the 
same neural circuits fire when we feel pain as when we observe pain in 
others? An influential recent proposal is that mirror systems get wired 
up through Hebbian learning.7 Neurons that fire together, on this ac-
count, wire together. The fact that parents imitate the facial expressions 
of their children in pain is sufficient to explain, therefore, how neural 
connections are established between the neural networks that process 
firsthand and secondhand pain.8
2. symPatHy and moral judGment
In Treatise 3.3.1., “of the origin of the natural virtues and vices,” Hume 
attempts to understand why we make moral judgments in situations 
where our interests are not at stake. It might be obvious why we praise 
beneficent characters, for example, when they advance our personal 
ends. But why do we feel the same way toward those who promote 
the good of others? In order to make sense of these evaluations, Hume 
invokes our natural tendency to mirror the emotions of those around 
us: “[It is] that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to 
give us the pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they 
had a tendency to our own advantage or loss” (T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579; cf. 
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T 3.3.1.25, SBN 588–89). We feel esteem toward beneficent agents, in 
other words, because we resonate with the happiness of those who are 
helped. When we judge that such characters are virtuous, on Hume’s 
account, we express these vicarious feelings.
 Hume recognizes that emotional contagion, however, cannot provide 
a complete account of moral judgment. The problem is that this propen-
sity is based on principles of associations that give rise to significant 
biases in our moral thought.9 The principle of resemblance leads us to 
enter more easily into the feelings of those who share our language, 
manners, or professions (T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318). The principle of causation 
renders the affections of our friends and family more lively than those 
of strangers (T 2.1.11.6, SBN 318). But it is the principle of contiguity, 
perhaps, that has the most dramatic impact on our welfare consider-
ations: “The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, 
than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues 
distant” (T 2.3.7.3, SBN 429). emotional contagion, it seems, requires 
exposure. We simply do not resonate with the pain and suffering of 
others, as Hume puts it, without “sight of the object” (T 2.2.7.4, SBN 
370; cf. 2.2.1.11.6, SBN 318).10
 our considered moral judgments, however, do not display these vi-
cissitudes. We do not believe upon reflection that beneficent characters 
are any less virtuous, for example, because they happen to have been 
born in remote times or places. Virtues and vices, we ordinarily think, 
are distance-invariant:
We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us than with persons 
remote to us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers; With our 
countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation 
of our sympathy we give the same approbation to the same moral 
qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and 
recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. 
The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. our esteem, 
therefore, proceeds not from sympathy. (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581)
our moral evaluations do not fluctuate in accordance with our personal 
relationships with agents. It is difficult to understand how these judg-
ments, therefore, could depend on the principles of association. It is 
these principles that lead us, after all, to discount the welfare of those 
unrelated to us.
 Moral judgments require us, as Hume puts it, to adopt a “general 
point of view.”11 When we evaluate the merits of distant characters, we 
must set our personal interests and attachments to the side and “place 
ourselves” in the position of those close to them (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 582; 
cf. T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602–3).
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Tis therefore from the influence of characters and qualities, upon 
those who have an intercourse with any person that we blame or 
praise him. We consider not whether the persons, affected by the 
qualities, be our acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners. 
(T 3.3.1.17, SBN 582)
The moral point of view takes into consideration the feelings of those 
who interact with the agent. It incorporates, as Philip Mercer puts it, 
the “hypothetical pain or pleasure of hypothetical associates of the 
agent.”12
 Consider our moral appraisal of Nero, for example, who murdered 
his own mother. We would not feel an intense hatred toward his cruelty, 
on Hume’s account, because this event took place in such a remote time 
and place. Indeed, we might feel a more lively resentment toward a bully 
who is cruel to children in our neighborhood. But we do not really think 
that one who steals lunch money is more villainous than one who sings 
while his nation burns. We recognize that we would feel greater disgust 
toward Nero if we lived under his bloody rule (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582).
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one 
perform’d in our neighborhood t’other day: The meaning of which is, 
that we know from reflexion, that the former action wou’d excite as 
strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac’d in 
the same position. (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 584)
our capacity to reflect on how we would feel in hypothetical scenarios, 
according to Hume, enables us to “correct” the biases in our prereflective 
moral thought (T 3.3.1.17, SBN 583). our considered moral judgments, 
on his account, express these adjusted sentiments.
3. a Puzzle in Hume’s etHical tHeory
Hume recognizes that this solution, however, appears to “contradict” 
a crucial assumption of his theory of justice (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 586). 
His argument for the artificiality of justice, after all, presupposes that 
human beings are indifferent toward the welfare of those outside our 
close circle (T 3.2.2.8, SBN 488). limited benevolence, as John rawls 
would put it, is a circumstance of justice. our ancestors were required 
to invent justice conventions because they understood that strangers 
bear “no kindness” toward them and thus could not be trusted to refrain 
from their possessions or reciprocate in social exchanges (T 3.2.5.8, 
SBN 520–21). These conventions would be superfluous, therefore, if we 
had the capacity to sympathize with the feelings of distant strangers. 
Agents with a “tender regard” for one another, as Hume puts it, would 
have little use for “distinctions and limits of property and possession” 
(T 3.2.2.16, SBN 494; cf. ePM 3.6, SBN 184–85).
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 Hume refers to our capacity to enter into the feelings of distant char-
acters as “extensive sympathy” (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 586, cf. T 3.3.6.3, SBN 
619). But the problem is that extensive sympathy with those in remote 
times or places, on his account, would produce extensive concern. We can 
express this tension in terms of a logically inconsistent triad. It appears 
that Hume endorses each of the following statements:
(1) Sympathy with the pain and suffering of others is sufficient to 
produce lively feelings of concern toward their plight. (S→C)
(2) We cannot make moral judgments about the cruelty of distant 
characters unless we sympathize with the pain and suffering 
of those in their close circle. (M→S)
(3) We can make moral judgments about the cruelty of distant 
characters, even though we feel little or no concern toward the 
welfare of those in their close circle. (M&~C)
If any two of these propositions is true, however, the third must be false. 
Hume simply cannot, as he seems to do, endorse all three.
 Hume maintains that the appearance of inconsistency can be “easily 
removed” by carefully examining the psychological foundations of our 
moral judgments (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 586). The crucial point is that our 
judgments concerning distant characters are based on counterfactual 
reasoning. When we judge that these agents are virtuous or vicious, 
according to Hume, we are asserting that we would feel love or hatred 
if we were close to them. We are not saying, however, that we actually 
feel this way: “Sentiments must touch the heart, to make them controul 
our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination to make 
them influence our taste” (ibid.). Adopting the general point of view, then, 
has little impact on our sentiments. our sympathy with those in remote 
times or places, as he puts it, is “far from being as lively as when our own 
interest is concern’d, or that of our particular friends; nor has it such 
an influence on our love and hatred” (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 584; cf. T 3.3.1.21, 
SBN 585). Hume appears to have found a way, then, to drive a wedge 
between extensive sympathy and limited benevolence. Moral reflection 
changes the way we talk about distant characters, on his account, but it 
does not significantly alter the way we feel about them (T 3.3.1.21, SBN 
585; cf. T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603).
 This solution to the puzzle, however, is not yet complete. let us grant 
that moral judgments express the sentiments that we would have in 
hypothetical scenarios. But this leaves open the question of how one 
can determine the truth-value of these counterfactuals. Hume proposes 
that we must rely on our imaginations as a guide. We must lay out the 
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scenario in our mind’s eye, as it were, and envision how we would feel 
in these circumstances. His comparison with our aesthetic judgments 
about poorly written texts is highly instructive:
When I run over a book with my eye, I imagine that I hear it all; and 
also, by the force of imagination, enter into the uneasiness which the 
delivery of it wou’d give the speaker. The uneasiness is not real; but as 
such a composition of words has a natural tendency to produce it, this 
is sufficient to affect the mind with a painful sentiment, and render 
the style harsh and disagreeable. (T 3.3.1.22, SBN 585–86)
Hume maintains that a “similar” operation of the mind underlies our 
moral judgments (T 3.3.1.22, SBN 586). We praise characters with be-
nevolent dispositions, even if they are prevented from acting, because 
we imaginatively enter into the pleasures that they would produce if 
released. Along the same lines, we condemn the cruelty of distant char-
acters because we enter into the pain and suffering of those in their 
close circle. But notice that this appears to take us back to where we 
started. If judging that Nero is vicious requires us to entertain ideas 
of the horrible torments of his victims, how could this possibly fail to 
produce lively feelings of compassion toward their plight?
 The crucial point is that our moral judgments about distant characters 
are based on epistemic attitudes that are “inferior to belief” (T 3.3.1.20, 
SBN 585). When we imagine the afflictions of those close to Nero, for 
example, we never lose sight of the fact that we are actually safe in our 
study. our sentimental responses are much weaker than they would be, 
therefore, if we genuinely believed that our real interests were at stake 
(T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583–84; cf. T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). Compare our aesthetic 
judgments concerning a building that appears to be dangerous, even 
though we are fully assured of its safety. We say that this structure is 
disagreeable on the grounds that it produces in us a “kind of fear”; but 
this response pales in comparison to our intense fright when we stand 
under a wall that we “really think tottering and insecure” (T 3.3.1.23, 
SBN 586).
 Contemporary research on the imagination allows us to develop this 
proposal.13 Adopting the moral point of view, in current terms, involves 
“cognitive pretence.”14 To understand how we would feel if we were closely 
related to Nero, we must represent a series of counterfactual propositions 
(for example, “I am a roman citizen” “the year is 64 ce,” and such) in 
our “possible world box.” even though we do not sincerely believe these 
statements, we can make inferences about the sentiments that would be 
appropriate if they were true. This computational model provides sup-
port, moreover, for Hume’s solution to the puzzle. The sentiments that 
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we experience during pretense episodes are “cognitively quarantined” 
from our practical reasoning system. Subjects who engage in pretence do 
not completely lose sight of reality. Children who pretend that a banana 
is a telephone, for example, do not really expect others to pick up their 
calls. Similarly, those who imagine that they are roman citizens living 
under Nero’s tyrannical rule do not actually fear for their lives.
4. first objection: imaGination and affect
our moral judgments about distant characters produce weak emotional 
responses, on Hume’s account, because we do not genuinely believe that 
we are closely related to them. one might wonder whether this solution 
to the puzzle is compatible, however, with his repeated assertions that 
the imagination has the power—independently of belief—to generate 
strong affective responses. Hume acknowledges that hypochondriacs 
make themselves sick, for example, by simply thinking that this is 
the case (T 2.1.11.7, SBN 319). But if the imagination has the power 
to make us ill, one might object, why cannot it generate vivid pangs of 
compassion? Hume could respond that there is an important difference 
between our epistemic attitudes in these cases. Hypochondriacs sincerely 
believe that they are sick; when we make moral judgments about Nero, 
however, we do not really believe (even for a second) that we are citizens 
of the roman empire.
 It would appear that Hume’s solution conflicts, however, with his 
official views concerning our emotional responses to the arts. Consider 
the case of tragedy. Hume acknowledges that spectators feel compassion 
toward those who suffer on stage, even though their misfortunes are 
known to be “fictitious” (T 2.2.7.3, SBN 369; cf. T 1.3.10.7, SBN 122):
The whole art of the poet is employed, in rousing and supporting 
the compassion and indignation, the anxiety and resentment of his 
audience. They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and 
never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to give 
vent to their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the tenderest 
sympathy and compassion. (oT 217)
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that audiences enter so deeply into the 
sorrows of these characters that makes it puzzling that we find tragedies 
so appealing.
 Hume can explain our strong affective responses to theatrical trag-
edies, however, in terms of our proximity to the events that unfold. We 
feel compassion toward those on stage because the emotions that they 
display are highly contagious. The actor who plays lear does not really 
grieve at the death of Cordelia, but he acts as if he does, and audiences 
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resonate with his gestures and expressions (T 2.2.7.3, SBN 369; cf. ePM 
5.26, SBN 221–22). our emotional responses to theatrical tragedies 
are softened, moreover, by the recognition that they are “nothing but a 
fiction” (oT 219; cf. T 1.3.9.15, SBN 115). Tragic poets borrow from his-
torical figures and scenes to give their work verisimilitude (T 1.3.10.6; 
SBN 121–22). But audiences do not confuse fiction and reality; our af-
fective responses to works of art might resemble those of real life, as 
Hume points out, but we can “easily distinguish” one from the other (T 
1.3.10.10, SBN 630).
 It would appear more difficult, perhaps, to reconcile Hume’s solution 
with his iron-cage example. Those who are suspended from a high tower 
would succumb to fear, he proposes, even if they were fully assured that 
the bars of the cage would prevent their fall:
A man, who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot 
forebear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he 
knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of 
the solidity of the iron, which supports him. (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148)
We often really tremble, as Hume puts it, in response to “imaginary 
danger” (ePM 5.14, SBN 217). It would appear that sincere belief is not, 
then, a necessary condition of strong emotional responses.
 This is an exceptional case, however, that can be explained away. The 
man in the cage is frightened, even though he believes that he is safe. 
But this is because his vivacious sensory impressions are associated 
with, and thus serve to enliven, his related ideas of descent and death (T 
1.3.13.10, SBN 148). The imagination, in other words, is “here assisted 
by the presence of a striking object” (ePM 5.14, SBN 217; cf. T 2.3.9.23, 
SBN 445). But this is not the case with the general point of view. When 
we reflect upon our possible feelings in hypothetical scenarios, there are 
no perceptual cues that could intensify our passions. We do not witness 
the wails and moans of Nero’s victims; as a result, our ideas of their 
afflictions are not converted into lively impressions.
5. second objection: symPatHy and simulation
To condemn the cruelty of Nero, on Hume’s account, we must take into 
consideration the pain and suffering of his victims. This moral judgment 
produces little or no concern toward their plight, however, because we 
do not sincerely believe the assumptions on which it is based. Sympa-
thy only produces compassion when we perceive the pain and suffering 
of others, but adopting the moral point of view merely requires us to 
imagine ourselves as spectators of their afflictions. This proposal can be 
developed, as we have seen, in terms of cognitive theories of pretense. But 
 HuMe’S THeory oF MorAl IMAGINATIoN 263
HPQ 27_3 text.indd   263 5/13/10   1:38:13 PM
264 HISTory oF PHIloSoPHy QuArTerly
there are alternative models of pretense available in cognitive sciences; 
these accounts, moreover, are quasi-perceptual in nature. one might 
reasonably wonder, then, whether they are compatible with Hume’s 
solution to the puzzle.
 Consider “simulation” theories of imagination.15 We identify the emo-
tional states of others, on these accounts, by reenacting or recreating 
the contents of their beliefs and desires. These “proxy” states are fed as 
input into our affective response system, and the output is used to make 
inferences about how they feel (Goldman 2006, 170).16 let us clarify 
this proposal with a simple example: D. Kahneman and A. Tversky’s 
airport experiment.17 Participants were asked to identify the feelings 
of two characters, Mr. Tees and Mr. Crane, whose limousine arrives at 
the airport thirty minutes after their flights were scheduled to depart. 
Mr. Crane is informed that his plane left on time; Mr. Tees is told that 
his flight was delayed and recently took off. Ninety-six percent of the 
participants who reflected on this imaginary scenario reported that Mr. 
Tees would have been more annoyed. How did they make this attribu-
tion? It is unlikely that they consulted folk theories about the feelings 
that are appropriate in this situation. It is more plausible to think that 
they envisioned themselves in similar circumstances and used the re-
sults of this imaginative procedure as a predictive tool.
 Simulation theory provides us with a novel formulation of the general 
point of view. To make judgments about distant characters, on this ac-
count, one must attempt to recreate the feelings and attitudes of those 
in their close circle. Moral distinctions would depend on whether this 
procedure generates sentiments of love or hatred, resentment or grati-
tude. Simulation theory sheds further light on why it is, moreover, that 
moral judgments produce weak affective responses. When we simulate 
the feelings of others—unless we are seriously delusional—we must 
“bracket” our own mental states. our psychological states, as it is said, 
are taken “off-line.” Consider the airport experiment once again. We can 
grant that participants relied on mental simulations to make predictions 
about the feelings of Mr. Tees. But it does not follow that those who made 
such attributions were ever seriously annoyed. And the reason for this 
is clear: simulators remain cognizant of the fact that they are not the 
ones who missed their flight and that the feelings of vexation properly 
belong to the target.
 one might object that this defense of Hume’s solution to the puzzle 
is based on an impoverished notion of perspective taking. Adopting 
the general point of view involves imagining how we would feel if we 
found ourselves in the situation of others. But what if this imaginary 
procedure was more radical in nature? In particular, what if it requires 
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us, as robert Gordon has suggested, to trade places with others and 
imagine how they feel in these circumstances?18 Projecting ourselves 
into the circumstances of distant characters does not produce strong 
affective responses, according to Hume, because we do not lose sight of 
our actual interests. But what if spectators underwent an “egocentric 
shift” and viewed the world from the eyes of others?
 Consider Gordon’s interpretation of the airport experiment. To iden-
tify the feelings of Tees or Crane, he proposes, simulators must make a 
series of adjustments, such that the indexical “I” is now occupied by the 
target (Gordon 1995a, 734).
[o]nce a personal transformation has been accomplished, there is no 
remaining task of mentally transferring a state from one person to 
another, no question of comparing Mr Tees to myself. For insofar as I 
have recentered my egocentric map on Mr Tees, I am not considering 
what rMG would do, think, want, and feel in the situation. Within 
the context of the simulation, rMG is out of the picture altogether. 
(Gordon 1995b, 56)
The crucial point is that we leave ourselves behind when we step into the 
shoes of others. We do not analogically infer from what we would feel to 
what they would feel. Just as good method actors transform themselves 
into their characters, simulators do not merely pretend that they find 
themselves in the situation of others; rather, they identify themselves 
as the subjects of these states. It is difficult to see how this variety of 
simulation could fail to have a profound emotional response: if the line 
between pretense and reality were blurred, our simulated feelings would 
go “on-line” (Gordon 1995a, 739).
 Hume can offer a decisive reply, however, to this line of objection. 
Consider the related challenge that he offers to egoists who attempt to 
reduce all moral judgments to considerations of selfish advantage. Hume 
rejects such proposals on the grounds that they cannot account for our 
praise and blame of beneficent characters in remote times or places (ePM 
5.7–10, SBN 215–16). It is implausible that spatially remote agents will 
promote our interests; and it is impossible that temporally distant ones 
can do so. Hume recognizes that a sophisticated egoist might respond, 
however, that we make these judgments by imaginatively projecting 
ourselves into the shoes of those who receive benefits. When we evalu-
ate distant characters, on this proposal, we express the happiness that 
we would feel in these circumstances.
 Hume presents the sophisticated egoist, however, with a serious 
dilemma. When we imagine ourselves in the shoes of others, we either 
distinguish reality and pretense, or else we confuse them. But either 
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way, the egoist cannot explain our moral judgments about distant char-
acters. If we do not sincerely believe that our interests are affected by 
these agents, then we would not feel esteem toward them. It is hard to 
understand, as Hume puts it, how a “real sentiment or passion can ever 
arise from a known imaginary interest, especially when our real inter-
est is still kept in view” (ePM 5.13, SBN 217). But it is just as difficult 
to grasp why we would praise the generosity of distant characters if we 
confuse reality and pretense and somehow transform ourselves into 
members of their close circle:
No force of imagination can convert us into another person, and make 
us fancy, that we, being that person, reap benefit from those valuable 
qualities, which belong to him. or if it did, no celerity of imagination 
could immediately transport us back, into ourselves, and make us love 
and esteem the person, as different from us. Views and sentiments, 
so opposite to known truth and to each other, could never have place, 
at the same time, in the same person. (ePM 6.3, SBN 234)
The challenge for egoists is not to explain, in other words, why someone 
else approves of this agent; rather, it is to account for the fact that they 
do so. But this means that they cannot completely leave their own per-
spective behind when they enter into the feelings of others.
 The egoist simply cannot have it both ways. And neither can the radi-
cal simulation theorist. If we trade places with others when we adopt 
the general point of view, as Gordon would have it, then we would no 
longer be the subject of these judgments. When we imagine ourselves 
in the shoes of others, in other words, we must remain cognizant of the 
fact that we are engaged in pretense. Hume’s solution to the puzzle is 
compatible, therefore, with both moderate and radical versions of simula-
tion theory. If we distinguish between reality and pretense, as Goldman 
would have it, then the simulation procedure would produce relatively 
weak affective responses; if we confuse reality and pretense, as Gordon 
would have it, then the simulation might produce lively feelings, but 
they would no longer be ours.
 one might object that Hume is hung by his own petard. When we 
make moral judgments, on his account, we do not sincerely believe the 
assumptions on which they are based. But then it becomes difficult to 
understand how these imaginary relationships could influence our real 
sentiments. This criticism, however, misses the point entirely. Hume’s 
official position, as we have seen, is that the moral imagination does not 
significantly change our interpersonal attitudes. It should be noted that 
his position is identical, in this regard, to the one put forth by Adam 
Smith. Smith’s account of sympathy requires us to project ourselves 
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imaginatively into the shoes of others: we “enter as it were into his 
body, and become in some measure the same person with him.”19 But 
he makes it clear that spectators do not become confused about their 
true identity:
The thought of their own safety, the thought that they themselves are 
not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and 
though it does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat 
analogous to what is felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiv-
ing anything that approaches the same degree of violence. (Smith 
2002, 27)
When we adopt the perspective of others, according to Smith, we do not 
blur the boundary between self and other. Adopting the moral point of 
view does not produce strong affective responses, then, because we never 
lose sight of the fact that we are engaged in role taking.
6. tHird objection: morality and tHe will
Adopting the moral point of view, according to Hume, requires us to 
imagine how we would feel in hypothetical scenarios. As Barry Stroud 
points out, however, this proposal appears to sever the conceptual link 
between morality and the will:
Hume is in danger of breaking the connection between moral judg-
ments and the will by arguing simply that feelings are involved or 
alluded to in some way or other in the making of every moral judg-
ment. He must show precisely how a “disinterested” moral judgment is 
nevertheless “active”, or how a thought or belief about merely possible 
feelings can lead us to act. That is something he never explains.20
Hume criticizes the moral rationalists on the grounds that they cannot 
account for the push and pull of moral considerations (T 3.1.1.6, SBN 
457). But it now seems that Hume’s account does not fare any better. 
The practical force of morality would be easy to explain if our evalu-
ations were constituted by actual feelings.21 But moral motivation is 
much harder to understand if our judgments are based on our possible 
feelings in counterfactual circumstances.
 It should be noted that this difficulty arises for any “spectator” theory 
of morals. The fact that impartial observers approve of a particular 
course of action, as Gilbert Harman points out, does not entail that 
agents must feel this way.22 This problem can be stated most forcefully, 
perhaps, in terms of simulation theory. To adopt the moral point of view, 
on the Humean account, we must “bracket” our psychological states. 
But if moral judgments require us to take our own beliefs and desires 
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“off-line” and substitute those of others, it becomes extremely difficult 
to see how they could influence the will. How could these judgments be 
action-guiding if they represent someone else’s mental states?
 let us consider a simple example. Suppose that we stand to gain a 
significant fortune from acts of wanton cruelty. Would the judgment that 
these actions are morally wrong influence our practical deliberation? It 
is hard to see, on Hume’s account, how it could. To adopt the moral point 
of view with regard to our own conduct, we must imagine the feelings 
of those who lack our particular interests. But this judgment is based 
on epistemic attitudes that fall short of belief; as a result, it seems that 
they will not significantly influence our passions. When we judge that 
our actions are morally wrong, on Hume’s account, we are asserting 
that we would disapprove of them if we were disinterested. But this 
says nothing about our actual mindset. It might be the case that, as a 
matter of fact, we remain entirely partial to our interests.
 To account for the practical force of morality, then, Hume must ex-
plain why the feelings of disinterested spectators matter to us. But he 
has the theoretical resources to do so. When we adopt the general point 
of view, on his account, we discover that others would not go along with 
our selfish behavior. This information does not, on its own, influence our 
passions. These considerations will only move us if we are responsive to 
the attitudes of others. Hume’s theory of sympathy, however, makes this 
inevitable. We do not only affectively resonate, on his account, with the 
pleasures and pains of others, but we also “naturally sympathize with 
others in the opinions that they entertain of us” (T 3.2.2.24, SBN 499; 
cf. T 2.1.11.9, SBN 320):
The sentiments of others can never affect us, but by becoming in some 
measure, our own, in which case they operate upon us, by opposing 
and increasing our passions, in the very same manner, as if they 
had been originally deriv’d from our own temper and disposition. (T 
3.3.2.3, SBN 593)
The gap between the spectator and agent perspectives is closed, then, 
when we come to see ourselves as others would (Brown 1994, 31). We 
would no longer merely imagine that others feel resentment toward our 
vices; rather, we would actually hate ourselves when we contemplate 
these actions.
7. conclusion
Sympathy plays two important roles in the Treatise. The first involves 
compassion: we care about those in distress because we vicariously 
feel their pain. The second involves moral judgment: we evaluate 
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distant characters by imagining the feelings of those in their narrow 
circle. Hume recognizes that assigning this double duty to sympathy, 
however, appears to undermine his theory of justice. His argument for 
the artificiality of justice presupposes that we have little compassion 
toward the welfare of strangers. But this is difficult to square with the 
claim that we can extensively sympathize with the feelings of those in 
distant times and places. It seems that we could not make moral judg-
ments that are universal in scope, on his account, without expanding 
our circle of concern.
 We can now see that this objection rests on an equivocation. The prob-
lem dissolves once we have disambiguated the two senses of sympathy 
at work in Hume’s moral psychology:
(1) Associative sympathy with the pain and suffering of others 
is sufficient to produce lively feelings of concern toward their 
plight.
(2) We cannot make moral judgments about the cruelty of distant 
characters unless we cognitively sympathize with the pain and 
suffering of those in their close circle.
(3) We can make moral judgments about the cruelty of distant 
characters, even though we feel little or no concern toward the 
welfare of those in their close circle.
This set of revised statements is entirely consistent. When we perceive 
someone in distress, our minds serve as mirrors, and we automati-
cally feel that person’s pain. But this is not true of the general point of 
view. When we imagine the feelings of those closely related to distant 
characters, we do not lose sight of the fact that our actual ties to these 
agents are weak; thus, our ideas of their sorrows and afflictions are not 
converted into lively impressions.
 Hume’s solution to the puzzle appears to have been on the right track. 
recent work in social neuroscience has demonstrated that affective mir-
roring and cognitive perspective taking recruit distinct areas of the brain. 
our capacity to resonate with the emotional states of those around us 
depends on mirror properties of neural systems in the emotional areas of 
the brain; but our capacity to imagine ourselves in the circumstances of 
others recruits cognitive areas in the prefrontal cortex.23 Hume’s hybrid 
theory of sympathy should appeal, then, to contemporary researchers 
who are interested in the nature of moral imagination.
University of Minnesota, Morris
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